…How can the proposed deal be a test of Iran’s intentions? The logic is most likely that if Iran is willing to submit a good portion of its LEU stockpile for peaceful purposes, this indicates that its intentions are probably peaceful, or at least not immediately military. Conversely, if Iran does not agree to the deal, this provides a strong indication that its intentions are not entirely peaceful: namely, that it is saving the enriched uranium for something else.

This test, however, is flawed in two important respects. The first dimension goes to the terms of the test itself. Even if Iran ultimately agrees to the deal, this by no means “proves” that its intentions are peaceful, because it may calculate that it can replenish the stocks in Natanz relatively quickly and perhaps use other secret facilities for this purpose as well. Moreover, it is working on the plutonium route in Arak. Similarly, if Iran does not agree to the draft, this in itself would not be “proof” that its intentions are necessarily military.

The second flaw is the very need to test Iran’s intentions. In fact, there are enough indications already that Iran’s intentions are not peaceful. One needs to look no further than the IAEA itself – not at the positions of its director-general, ElBaradei, rather those of his deputy, Olli Heinonen. Heinonen indicated already in February 2008 that the IAEA possesses evidence that is not consistent with any explanation other than that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. The existence of the second enrichment plant at Qom also points in this direction.

As such, these tests of Iran’s intentions add nothing, but more problematic, they can be dangerous. The so-called test of Iran’s intentions has been framed in a manner that if this week Iran agrees to the deal – especially after saying that it needs more time once the US, Russia, and France have all agreed – the determination of the international community to confront it firmly will very likely decrease considerably. It will seem thatIran has “finally” chosen the route of cooperation, whereas in reality the specific deal that will have been secured does nothing more than (at best) delay Iran’s plans.

The international community cannot afford to allow this deal to distract it from the broader goal that it has set for itself, which is to stop Iranfrom advancing toward nuclear weapons. If Iran accepts the deal, the challenge for the international community will be to continue negotiations while maintaining the same degree of determination as before the deal was secured. At the very least, it should consider postponing provision of reactor fuel to Iran until a more comprehensive deal with Iran – that addresses the real issues of concern – is carved out.

And if Iran rejects the deal, the international community will be left in an awkward position, but at least its determination to stop Iran will likely remain strong.